This piece of the article is authored By:- Agam Gupta
As per the Annual Report, 2023-24 of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), India currently shelters 57,665 Sri Lankan refugees across refugee camps in Tamil Nadu and 19 in Odisha, alongside 32,938 refugees residing outside these camps. This is the result of waves of persecution, massacres, and systemic discrimination against the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka that went on for over four decades since the 1980s.
Hence, these refugees have been living in India for decades, some even since 1984. Yet, they continue to exist in a legal and existential limbo. Until 2025, they were officially termed as ‘illegal migrants’ under the Foreigners Act, meaning thereby foreigners entering India without travel documents/ overstaying beyond the permitted period. Therefore, they could be deported or arrested at any time.
The Immigration & Foreigners (Exemption) Order, 2025 (the Order), under Section 33 of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 (the Act), exempts registered Sri Lankan Tamils who entered on or before 9 Jan 2015 from penal sanctions for lacking passports/visas. This administrative relief removes criminal exposure by removing the ‘illegal migrant’ label, but does not confer refugee, resident, or citizenship rights, nor does it change their classification as ‘foreigners.’ Hence, this Order does little to alter their continuing status of being ‘stateless’.
This blog analyzes the crisis-like situation of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, their plight in India by comparing their state with other refugee groups in India and global best practices that India can adopt in pursuance of its refugee policy.
- The Legal Effect of the Order and Its Limits
Under the Act, every foreign national is required to possess a valid passport and visa, unless specifically exempted. In this context, the Order brings much respite by listing categories of people who are not bound by these requirements. These include members of India’s armed forces, citizens of Nepal and Bhutan, registered Tibetan residents, persecuted minorities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and, for the first time, registered Sri Lankan Tamils who entered India on or before January 9, 2015.
Prima facie, this inclusion seems a nod to parity. Historically, India has offered both exemptions and Long-Term Visas (LTVs) to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian asylum-seekers from its Muslim-majority neighbors, recognizing their persecution. Yet, this parity ends at the surface level as, unlike the other groups, Sri Lankan Tamils are still not granted any pathway beyond this temporary relief. LTVs, issued annually and renewable up to five years, grant a quasi-resident status to eligible foreign nationals and can lead to Indian citizenship through naturalization after eleven years of continuous residence. The Order explicitly grants these minorities a tangible pathway from asylum to citizenship in a way. However, for Sri Lankan Tamils, this door is locked, as the officials have confirmed that Sri Lankan Tamils are still not eligible to apply for LTVs.
Given that the only formal route to citizenship remains through registration or naturalization under the Citizenship Act, 1955, the Sri Lankan Tamils will not be able to acquire the same. This is where the catch lies. This path, theoretically, is open to any foreigner; however, the 1986 MHA letter to chief secretaries explicitly prohibits the naturalization of Sri Lankan refugees who arrived in India in July 1983 or later. This decades-old policy continues to bar Tamil refugees from citizenship, irrespective of merit or length of stay.
Even when the 2019 Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) fast-tracked citizenship for persecuted non-Muslim minorities from the neighboring countries, it explicitly omitted the Sri Lankan Tamils. Therefore, currently, they have no formal path to acquire Indian citizenship under any law. Even the interventions made by the Madras High Court (HC) directing the Centre to consider a refugee’s naturalization plea have met bureaucratic resistance. Therefore, though the Order does offer relief from prosecution, it fails to provide a place to belong for these Tamil refugees. They remain without passports, property ownership rights, or even valid identity documents, hence ‘stateless within the State’.
- India’s Policy Contrasts and the Plight of Sri Lankan Tamils
India is no signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons, or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Nor does it have a domestic refugee law. It regulates refugees and asylum seekers through the LTV Guidelines and ad hoc administrative orders in practice. Under the present policy regime, India grants LTVs to persecuted non-Muslim minorities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, yet Sri Lankan Tamils, whose persecution is ethnic or linguistic rather than religious, fall outside this humanitarian net.
| Aspect | Non-Muslim Minorities (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh) | Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees |
| Legal Basis | Explicitly protected under the CAA, which fast-tracks citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians from the three countries. | Excluded from the CAA framework; governed only by the Foreigners Act, 1946, which treats them as undocumented migrants. |
| Residence Rights | Entitled to LTVs even without valid passports, granting legal residence and permission to work and travel. | Possess only State Govt. issued identity cards for vehicle registration and some benefits. |
| 2025 Home Ministry Order | The Order reaffirmed LTV relaxations for these six CAA-listed communities. | The same order made no mention of Sri Lankan Tamils. A government official confirmed they are “not eligible to apply for LTVs.” |
| Citizenship Pathway | Can apply for citizenship after 11 years of residence — the CAA effectively opens a “backdoor to citizenship.” | Though the Citizenship Act theoretically allows naturalization, no clear route exists for Sri Lankan Tamils, and they remain stateless. |
| Aspect | Tibetan Refugees | Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees |
| Documentation | Must register and obtain a Registration Certificate (RC) — a renewable proof of residence. | Have only camp or police certificates with no legal validity. |
| Mobility and Travel | RC allows domestic travel (with prior notice); eligible for Indian-issued Identity Certificates (ICs) enabling international travel. | Movement restricted to camps; no international travel documents. |
| Access to Rights and Services | RC holders can study, open bank accounts, get driving licenses, and work within limits; access certain public benefits. | Access to services is informal, inconsistent, and state-dependent; no legal entitlements. |
| Legal Status and Permanence | Quasi-legal residence: renewable and recognized, giving stability though not citizenship. | Perpetually temporary and precarious; stateless with no path to regularization. |
These inconsistencies across refugee groups highlight that India’s approach operates more on political selectivity than on a consistent humanitarian or legal framework.
- Reforms to be undertaken
It is evident that owing to the legislative vacuum, India’s refugee governance relies on the system of ad hoc directions, visa exemptions, and cabinet circulars. Therefore, an urgent need arises for a durable, rights-based model that goes beyond the system of temporary reliefs.
To cater to this, the first step could be rescinding the 1986 MHA Directive itself. Lifting the ban on naturalization of Sri Lankan Tamils, extending the LTV eligibility to them, or amending the citizenship framework to enact special provisions for their registration would be meaningful steps in this regard. Alternatively, India could adopt a two-step integration program modeled on the U.S. approach of granting temporary protection combined with a time-limited legislative pathway to adjust status, i.e., an executive-level pause on removals and work authorization for affected nationals, followed by a statute (similar to the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness provision in the U.S.) that permits eligible long-settled refugee families to apply for permanent residency. Alongside fast-track naturalization or group-based recognition (similar to CAA), following these steps would be in the spirit of India’s humanitarian commitments.
Equally important is the issuance of formal identity documents carrying ‘Tamil Refugee’ status, in place of the temporary identity cards. If we digitize these records with biometric data, it would even help us track births, deaths, and migrations. Further, it would help us ensure that every refugee child receives a birth certificate and an Aadhaar card. Since over 95% of refugees already hold Aadhaar and 78% have bank accounts, these systems can be expanded to provide access to education, welfare, and healthcare.
Finally, to ensure genuine economic and institutional inclusion, Tamil refugees must be permitted to work legally in the public and private sectors, purchase property, and register businesses. Courts could impose deadlines for decision-making, like the Madras HC’s directive requiring MHA action within eight weeks. Only adopting such an approach would ensure recognition with dignity.
- Conclusion
This Order only makes a partial compassionate step. True, the Order aligns well with India’s long-standing approach of temporary tolerance, but it simultaneously presents the paradoxes within the same approach. Even after decades of living in India, entire generations of Sri Lankan Tamils continue to exist and not belong. Repeal of exclusionary directives and access to LTVs or naturalization are essential to move from exemption to integration. India has already proven its ability to act humanely for other persecuted groups; extending that vision to Sri Lankan Tamils would simply complete the arc of its constitutional promise.