Apurva Jha & Riyasha Anand1
Introduction
Migration and procedures related to border governance have become a defining issue in South Asian Geopolitics, shaping the motion of India’s bilateral relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar. In February 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced the withdrawal of the FMR, the Free Movement Regime, with Myanmar and started plans to fence the border, citing concerns of civil and internal security and geographic and demographic preservation in the North-eastern regions. This decision marks a pretty decisive shift from years of comparatively open and liberal borders to a more closed and restrictive model of management.
The outcome of these particular policies is already pretty evident. Between 31st December, 2024 and 02nd January 2025, thirty individuals were deported, pointing at India’s stronger position on irregular and illegal migration. At the same time, the nation goes on to host approximately 40,000 refugees of Rohingya who had earlier escaped Myanmar’s military operations, but at the same time, Bangladesh remains the major host of a large number of Rohingya. The condition becomes more complex due to migration induced by climate change in Bangladesh, where rising sea levels and frequent cyclones cause the displacement of large populations. In conjunction, these arenas give an idea that border management in this particular area cannot be comprehended only as an administrative exercise by the government, but it is deeply rooted in the accounts of trade, security, diplomacy and even humanitarian considerations.
The End of the Free Movement Regime
The abolition of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) is a big shift in India’s border control strategy. In February 2024, Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced the decision, which had been increasingly receiving political support, including from former Manipur Chief Minister N. Biren Singh, who blamed uncontrolled cross-border movement for persisting ethnic tensions in the state. The Home Ministry justified the action as being central to bolstering internal security and protecting demographic equilibrium, further ensuring that fencing would be built along the entire border.
Under the new setup, the previous provision allowing residents to move up to 16 kilometres across either side of the border for two weeks has been substituted with a tighter “border pass” system, overseen by the Assam Rifles, admitting entry for only seven days. This development signals more than an administrative tightening. Historically, the FMR also served India’s Act East policy by facilitating cultural and commercial ties with Myanmar’s Chin and Sagaing states, thereby balancing Chinese influence in the region. Its termination, therefore, represents not only a domestic security measure but also a reorientation with potential diplomatic costs.
The Rohingya and Regional Migration Dynamics
This crisis is not a recent phenomenon. The first major displacement occurred during Myanmar’s Operation King Dragon in 1978, when approximately 200,000 Rohingya sought refuge in Bangladesh. The scale of displacement has intensified dramatically in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, with UNHCR reporting that in 2023, one Rohingya died or went missing for every eight attempting perilous sea voyages. With women and children now constituting more than three-quarters of the population, the humanitarian stakes have never been higher. Meanwhile, deteriorating conditions inside Myanmar have made humanitarian access increasingly limited, amplifying the strain on regional systems of migration management.
The Rohingya crisis continues to frame India’s migration discourse within a broader regional context. Bangladesh now shelters approximately one million Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar alone, while India has become home to smaller but politically significant numbers. According to the Railway Protection Force, 586 Bangladeshi and 318 Rohingya migrants were apprehended between 2021 and 2023 while attempting irregular crossings, illustrating the persistence of such flows despite restrictions.
This crisis is not a recent phenomenon. The first major displacement occurred during Myanmar’s Operation King Dragon in 1978, when approximately 200,000 Rohingya sought refuge in Bangladesh. The scale of displacement has intensified dramatically in the wake of Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, with UNHCR reporting that in 2023, one Rohingya died or went missing for every eight attempting perilous sea voyages. With women and children now constituting more than three-quarters of the population, the humanitarian stakes have never been higher. Meanwhile, deteriorating conditions inside Myanmar have made humanitarian access increasingly limited, amplifying the strain on regional systems of migration management.
Conclusion
India’s shifting approach to migration and border governance reflects the delicate balance between national security imperatives and humanitarian responsibilities in an increasingly unstable regional environment. The absence of a comprehensive domestic refugee framework has left policy responses fragmented, even as India hosted more than 240,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers by the close of 2024. While India has historically positioned itself as a sanctuary for displaced communities, the decision to end the FMR highlights the extent to which security considerations now dominate the policy landscape.Looking ahead, pressures on India’s migration system are only expected to intensify. Climate change is accelerating displacement from Bangladesh, while Myanmar’s political turmoil continues to force new waves of refugees across borders. Without a coherent national framework or participation in international instruments such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, India’s capacity to manage these flows remains constrained. Sustainable solutions will require not only careful domestic policy design but also robust regional cooperation, ensuring that border governance enhances rather than undermines India’s broader strategic and humanitarian commitments in South Asia.
- The authors are third-year law students at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. They may be contacted at apurva.jha@nusrlranchi.ac.in and riyasha.anand@nusrlranchi.ac.in. ↩︎