This piece of the article is authored By:- Mughil M S 4th year law student at Tamil Nadu National Law University.
India is the world’s largest democracy, conducting elections at multiple levels — the Lok Sabha, thirty-one State Legislative Assemblies, and thousands of local body constituencies. The frequency and scale of these elections impose enormous costs on the national exchequer, the administrative machinery, and the governance cycle. In this context, the concept of One Nation, One Election (ONOE) — formally introduced as the 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2024 — has emerged as one of the most transformative and debated electoral reforms in post-independence India. The proposal seeks to synchronise the election cycles of the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies so that voters cast their ballots simultaneously across the country. While proponents argue that it will reduce cost, curb governance disruptions, and improve administrative efficiency, critics warn of grave constitutional, federal, and democratic consequences. This article critically examines the historical context, constitutional implications, and feasibility of ONOE as an electoral reform policy.
The idea of simultaneous elections is not entirely new to India. In the early decades after independence, elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Assemblies were indeed held simultaneously from 1951 to 1967. The cycle was disrupted primarily due to the premature dissolution of certain State Assemblies and the Lok Sabha itself, leading to a fragmented electoral calendar. Over decades, this fragmentation deepened, resulting in a situation where India is perennially in “election mode” — with elections to one state or another taking place almost every few months. The resurgence of the ONOE debate gained momentum when the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections, chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, was constituted on 2nd September 2023 to explore its feasibility. The committee’s comprehensive report was accepted by the Union Cabinet on 18th September 2024, marking a decisive political step toward implementation.
Constitutional Framework and Required Amendments
Implementing ONOE is not merely a logistical exercise — it demands a careful and extensive constitutional reengineering. The Constitution of India, under Article 83, fixes the term of the Lok Sabha at five years, while Article 172 does the same for State Legislatures. However, Article 85 empowers the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha before the expiry of its term, and Article 174 provides a similar power for State Governors with respect to State Assemblies. These provisions for premature dissolution are integral to the parliamentary system of government, which is itself part of the basic structure of the Constitution as affirmed in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).
To synchronise elections, these dissolution provisions would need to be curtailed or conditioned, which raises the question: does such a curtailment violate the basic structure doctrine? The Kovind Committee reportedly recommended amendments to Articles 82A, 83, 172, and 327, along with the introduction of new provisions that would allow extension or curtailment of the terms of State Assemblies to align them with the Lok Sabha cycle during a transitional phase. Such amendments would require ratification by not less than half of all State Legislatures under Article 368, making political consensus an essential prerequisite.
Federalism: The Core Constitutional Challenge
Perhaps the most significant constitutional objection to ONOE concerns its impact on India’s federal structure. The Constitution, while not using the word “federal” explicitly, establishes a clear division of powers between the Union and the States under the Seventh Schedule. Elections to State Assemblies are matters of state autonomy, and the democratic mandate of a state government is inherently tied to the confidence of its own legislature, not to the schedule of the Union Parliament.
Forcing a state government to extend its tenure artificially — or worse, curtailing it to align with a national election — fundamentally interferes with the principle of democratic self-determination of the states. Critics argue that this amounts to a structural subordination of state democracy to Union convenience, which conflicts with the federal principle that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld as part of the basic structure in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). The Bommai judgment had famously restrained arbitrary dismissal of state governments, and any ONOE framework that permits the Centre to dictate the electoral calendar of states risks undoing that constitutional protection.
Former Chief Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and J.S. Khehar have acknowledged the constitutional viability of ONOE in principle, but both have stressed the critical need for safeguards to prevent the concentration of “unbridled powers” in the Election Commission of India. Without robust checks, the Election Commission could effectively become a tool for managing electoral cycles in ways that benefit the ruling dispensation at the Centre.
Impact on Regional Parties and Political Pluralism
India’s political landscape is deeply pluralistic. Regional parties like the Trinamool Congress, DMK, TRS, AAP, and others derive their strength from state-level mandates built on local issues such as language, agrarian policy, land rights, and regional identity. ONOE, by holding simultaneous elections, risks a phenomenon known as “wave effect” or “nationalisation of state elections” — where the dominant national narrative, often shaped by the ruling party at the Centre, overshadows local concerns.
Research and electoral data from countries like South Africa and Sweden, which practice forms of synchronised elections, show that simultaneous elections tend to reduce the salience of regional issues. In India’s diverse, multi-party democracy, this could effectively disadvantage regional parties and reduce the meaningful representation of subnational identities, thereby undermining the spirit of democratic federalism. The voter’s ability to hold state governments independently accountable — based on local performance — may be diluted when the election is dominated by national campaigns and national personalities.
Supporters of ONOE advance several strong arguments that deserve fair consideration:
- Reduction in election expenditure: The Election Commission of India and independent economists estimate that the country spends thousands of crores of rupees on repeated elections. Simultaneous elections could substantially reduce this fiscal burden on both the government and political parties.
- Governance continuity: Frequent elections trigger the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which restricts policy announcements and programme implementation. A single synchronised election would limit MCC’s interference to a shorter period, enabling sustained governance.
- Administrative efficiency: Security forces, election officials, and electronic voting machine (EVM) infrastructure are stretched across multiple staggered elections. Synchronising elections would optimise these resources.
- Reduced voter fatigue: With multiple elections year-round, voter engagement and turnout may suffer. Simultaneous elections could re-energise democratic participation by making each electoral exercise more significant.
Logistical and Administrative Feasibility
Beyond constitutional concerns, the logistical scale of ONOE is staggering. India currently has approximately 95 crore registered voters, and conducting elections for both the Lok Sabha and all State Assemblies simultaneously would require a massive mobilisation of EVMs, VVPAT machines, polling personnel, and security forces. The Election Commission of India would need a significant increase in resources and advance planning. The Kovind Committee’s proposed phased approach — wherein ONOE is introduced gradually rather than all at once — partially addresses these concerns. Under this model, State Assemblies whose terms end close to the Lok Sabha cycle would be aligned first, with remaining assemblies following in subsequent phases.
Comparative Perspective
Globally, several democracies practice some form of simultaneous elections. Sweden holds elections for its national parliament (Riksdag), county councils, and municipal assemblies on the same day every four years. South Africa conducts national and provincial elections simultaneously. However, these countries operate under unitary or quasi-unitary structures that are fundamentally different from India’s quasi-federal constitutional design. A mechanical import of their model without accounting for India’s unique constitutional character and diversity would be constitutionally unsound and politically impractical.
Conclusion
The One Nation, One Election proposal is a bold and ambitious electoral reform that addresses genuine inefficiencies in India’s democratic process. Its potential to reduce costs, enhance governance stability, and rationalise administrative resources is well-acknowledged even by its critics. However, the constitutional feasibility of ONOE hinges on a delicate balancing act — one that must respect the basic structure doctrine, preserve federal autonomy, safeguard political pluralism, and prevent the centralisation of electoral power. The 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill represents only the beginning of what must be a deep national conversation involving Parliament, State Legislatures, the Election Commission, the judiciary, and civil society. Electoral reform in a democracy as complex and diverse as India cannot be driven by administrative convenience alone — it must be anchored in constitutional fidelity, democratic values, and federal integrity. ONOE, if implemented with robust constitutional safeguards, ratified through genuine political consensus, and introduced through a carefully phased approach, could be both feasible and transformative. Without these conditions, it risks becoming a reform that compromises the very democratic foundation it seeks to strengthen.