Teghveer Singh*
Introduction
Chomsky’s critique of the education system reflects a long-standing concern about education: universities do not just produce degrees; they also shape political thinking and public consciousness. It is within this broader context that the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly has recently passed the Jharkhand State University Act, 2026 (JSU Act, 2026) in its monsoon session, withdrawing the 2025 Bill and introducing a few changes, including “clerical mistakes” which might have undermined the already dire state of India’s academic autonomy.
The Educational Crisis in Jharkhand
To set the context and the tone for this discussion, it is pertinent to note that Jharkhand ranks third lowestamongst states in Higher Education Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at 18.6%, compared to the national average of 28.4%. Reports indicate that this is due to a severe lack of institutions, noting that the state has a college population index of 8 against the national average of 23. This quantitative deficit is further aggravated by a qualitative analysis, where data indicates that “96 colleges out of 308 colleges have been accredited before the introduction of the Revised Accreditation Format (RAF). Only 14 Colleges are accredited in the RAF.”
This data shows that the status of Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in the state is severely underdeveloped compared to national standards. However, the official directorate states that the government has taken up initiatives to bridge this gap. Another significant development in this regard was the JSU Act, 2026. The Act aims to “provide for better governance, academic standards, quality education, academic autonomy and excellence, adequate representation through a democratic process, and strengthen the higher education institutions”. However, analysing it critically reveals problematic tendencies to subvert the sanctity of academic autonomy and democracy. The Act’s structure itself gradually shifts authority away from academic bodies and toward executive and bureaucratic control. Looking closely at these provisions helps show how the balance between university autonomy and State power is being reshaped.
Restructuring University Governance
For instance, the scope of these “minor changes” mentioned by Minister Sudivya Kumar is a shift from nullifying entirely the Governor’s power to appoint the Vice Chancellors to “be selected jointly by the Chancellor and Chief Minister”.[1] While projected as a compromise, the provision effectively institutionalises executive participation in academic appointments and significantly alters the traditional governance structure of universities.
This shift is important because under Article 163, the Governor is ordinarily “aided and advised” by the Council of Ministers. Yet the Supreme Court has held that a Governor as Chancellor of a university must act independently without this aid and advice.
This concern becomes more problematic when viewed along with section 12(9)(d), which allows the Chief Minister and Chancellor to decide together if there exists an “emergency”. It also allows them to appoint an interim Vice-Chancellor for up to a year.[2] Arbitrariness for extended interim appointments may result from such a section. Similarly, section 8 grants the State Government overwhelming authority to prescribe statutes on “curriculum design, governance structures, disciplinary administration, grievance mechanisms, and any other matter” deemed necessary by the State.[3] These sections give immense power to the executive to intervene in the internal functioning of universities. Thus, they have a significant impact on institutional autonomy.
The Act further extends this administrative control through provisions such as section 39, which designates university employees as “public servants”,[4] and section 12(13)(f), which permits removal for “working against the Government or the interest of education”.[5] The “public servant” designation has deeper implications. It subjects university officials to Chapter XII of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which penalises a public servant’s disobedience of the law and other breaches of official duty. It also gives them the protection of Chapter XIII, which criminalises obstruction of a public servant’s lawful directions. Read alongside Section 12(13)(f), this transforms the nature of academic discourse: meaningful dissent can become ‘obstruction’ of a public servant, and ordinary administrative discretion becomes exposed to Chapter XII liability. The designation hands the State criminal punishments that were never built for the argumentative and liberal culture a university is supposed to have. The vagueness of such language creates the possibility of disciplinary action against dissenting academic or administrative positions. These sections are also problematic when viewed in the context of the doctrine of colourable legislation. In K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Odisha, the Apex Court clarified that the doctrine was applicable when the law indirectly does something it can’t do directly. Read cumulatively, these provisions reflect a shift from collegial university governance toward a more centralised and bureaucratically regulated model of higher education administration.
Beyond Party Politics
Naturally, the bill has received criticism from the opposition. Opposition legislators have expressed concerns about the politicisation of education. Similar contentions about the “death of democracy” have been raised in Tamil Nadu. However, it is worth noting that the first state to pass similar legislation was Gujarat in 1978 under the rule of the Janata Party, the predecessor of Jharkhand’s current opposition. More recently, legislation has been enacted in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, which happened to be ruled by Jharkhand’s opposition. In these states as well, such measures attracted opposition and criticism, which often point out the “brazen centralisation” in the domain of education. It reflects a deeper tussle over control of higher education, which is beyond party politics.
Universities as Sites of Power
It is therefore obvious that all these parties, while occupying different places on the ideological spectrum, are all parties to the politicisation of education. To understand the agendas behind this, it is important to understand some theoretical frameworks. Louis Althusser argued that educational institutions function as “Ideological State Apparatuses” through which the State reproduces existing socio-political hierarchies. This, understood in light of Michel Foucault’s idea that modern institutions act as ‘prison-like spaces’, reveals that administrative intervention in education is often used as a measure to achieve political ends.
When a government controls who leads universities, who teaches and who doesn’t and what they teach, it shapes the definition of what is ‘right’. Researchers at the V-Dem Institute find that “substantial decline in academic freedom results in either authoritarian consolidation or democratic collapse”. This is clearly reflected in the data: India’s Academic Freedom Index score fell to its lowest in almost 90 years from 0.6 in 2013 to 0.2 in 2023, while the V-Dem Report also notes a continued deterioration across democratic indicators.
In such a situation, one might expect stronger judicial intervention. The Courts have previously emphasised intellectual freedom in higher education. However, excessive judicial intervention has been observed in recent controversies surrounding NCERT revisions. These controversies have raised concerns about matters involving academic content and educational policy. While the Courts have historically defended constitutional values, their unwillingness to directly engage with questions of academic independence may indirectly give way to greater executive influence over universities and education in general.
Education, Infrastructure, and Employability
In that sense, the JSU Act is more of a political project than an educational policy. This is backed by examining the structural financial priorities of the state. The budget for education this year is 13.3%, which is lower than the national average of 14.5%. Yet, this looks like a strong move toward development on paper, in line with tendencies of the government to use welfare to gain political populism. However, structural problems often remain neglected due to a lack of focus on broader structural developments. This is acknowledged even by the Department of Higher and Technical Education.
However, despite this, according to the Budget at a Glance (2026-27), education alone receives 11.57% of total expenditure. On the other hand, key sectors like Energy (2.70%), Roads & Transport (4.38%), and Urban Development & Housing (2.47%) sum up to only 9.55%. Without enough investment in infrastructure like urban development and transport, spending on education yields very low returns, as the conversion of education into employment opportunities remains low.
This has also been reflected in studies. The ILO’s India Employment Report 2024 studied educated youth in Ranchi. It found that while most young people wanted stable and professional jobs, the opportunities available rarely matched their educational backgrounds. On average, many also waited more than a year to find their first job. It is clear that students aren’t merely interested in degrees. They want a stable future.
The Supreme Court, in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, stressed the importance of education in equipping “a citizen to participate in achieving the objectives enshrined in the preamble”. Further, the National Education Policy 2020 links education with “achieving full human potential, developing an equitable and just society, and promoting national development”. Seen in this light, it is clear that laws not addressing the underlying structural barriers to employment yield no fruitful results.
Caught Between the Centre and the State
However, this overreach is merely a response to a larger centralised overreach. It has been widely reported that the Union Government has been misusing the regulatory framework of the University Grants Commission (UGC) for imposing control over higher education.
Furthermore, in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, the Apex Court clearly laid down that the UGC regulations are mandatory for state universities. It is noteworthy that the JSU Act does not operate against this judgment. However, it adopts a more subtle strategy. Section 4(1)(u) mandates universities to “carry out all instructions by UGC”. Section 12(3) further subjects appointments for VCs to “eligibility criteria prescribed by the UGC”. Yet, it is clearly visible from the analysis above that such compliance is, at most, lip service. In reality, a lot of power is concentrated in the hands of the State executive.
From this perspective, the JSU Act, 2026, amongst other examples mentioned above, can be seen as a reactionary measure. The Government has also attracted a lot of criticism from the opposition regarding the same. However, it is ironic that the state has itself adopted a similar approach. It is clear that educational autonomy suffers the most in a power struggle between the Centre and the state.
Conclusion
The debate around the JSU Act is about a single political party; it raises a bigger question about the role higher education plays in a democracy. The 1948-49 University Education Commission, chaired by Dr S. Radhakrishnan, declared resistance towards political dominance in education. This was supported by the Supreme Court later in TMA Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka. Democratic values have been declared to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution since the Kesavananda Bharati case. Universities are more than mere centres for degrees; they are spaces that promote critical thinking and dissent, thus fostering the spirit of democracy. The democratic spirit is the ultimate sufferer of such excessive political control. Rather than mere political expansion, Jharkhand should focus on building independent and credible institutions to actually achieve meaningful reforms. This can be ensured by taking a couple of measures: increasing transparency in Vice Chancellor appointments, limiting arbitrary ‘emergency’ powers, and protecting academic freedom. Simultaneously, funding should be infrastructure-oriented and not just towards expanding bureaucracy.
* The author is a Second-Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. The author may be contacted at teghveer.singh@nusrlranchi.ac.in.
This blog reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of The Policy Chronicle.
[1] Jharkhand State Universities Act, No. 5 of 2026, § 12(3).
[2] Id. §12(9).
[3] Id. §§8(2)(d), 8(2)(i), 8(3)(i).
[4] Id. §39.
[5] Id. §12(13)(f).